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Abstract
Yearly estimates of  urban and rural direct losses (excess deaths) from the 1932–34 famine are presented for the 
oblasts of  Soviet Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, the highest losses are not found in the grain-producing 
southern oblasts, but in the north-central Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts. Several hypotheses are proposed and tested 
to explain this finding. No single hypothesis provides a comprehensive explanation. Losses in some oblasts are 
due to specific factors, while losses in other oblasts seem to be explained by a combination of  economic and 
political factors. Quantitative analyses are presented of  resistance and Soviet repressions in 1932, and effects of  
the food assistance program and historical-political factors on direct losses in 1933 are analyzed. 
Keywords: 1932–33 famine losses by oblast; Holodomor; regional Holodomor losses; Ukrainian famine; 
urban and rural Holodomor losses.
Résumé
Des estimations annuelles de pertes (décès excédentaires) directement attribuables à la famine de 1932–34 
sont présentées pour les zones urbaines et rurales d’Ukraine sovietique. Contrairement aux attentes, les 
pertes les plus importantes n’étaient pas dans la région méridionale productrice de grain, mais plutôt dans la 
région du nord-centre, soit Kiev et Kharkiv. Plusieurs hypothèses sont proposées et mises à l’épreuve pour 
vérifier cette conclusion. Cependant, aucune hypothèse, à elle seule, ne fournit une explication complète. 
Dans certaines régions, les pertes sont causées par des facteurs précis, alors que dans d’autres, les pertes 
sont expliquées par une combinaison de facteurs économiques et politiques. Des analyses quantitatives sont 
présentées sur la résistance et les répressions sovietiques en 1932. L’effet du programme d’assistance alimen-
taire et les facteurs politico-historiques attribuables directement aux pertes en 1933 est également analysé. 
Mots-clés : pertes de la famine de 1932–33 par région; holodomor; pertes régionales de l’holodomor; 
famine en Ukraine; pertes urbaines et rurales de l’holodomor.
Introduction
The 1932–34 famine in Ukraine, also known as the Holodomor (death by hunger), is an extreme example of  a 
man-made famine that resulted in millions of  losses.2 As a result of  our research, Holodomor losses have been 
estimated at 4.5 million, with 3.9 million excess deaths and 0.6 million lost births (Rudnytskyi et al. 2015). Direct 
losses or excess deaths (these terms will be used interchangeably) are additional deaths caused by the famine; indirect 
1. Oleh Wolowyna, Center for Slavic, Eurasian and East European Studies, University of  North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
935 White Cross Rd., Chapel Hill, NC 27516 USA, e-mail: olehw@aol.com; Serhii Plokhy, Director, Harvard Ukrainian
Research Institute; and Nataliia Levchuk, Omelian Rudnytskyi, Senior Researchers, and Alla Kovbasiuk and Pavlo
Shevchuk, Researchers, Ptoukha Institute of  Demography and Social Studies, at the National Academy of  Sciences of
Ukraine (NASU), Kyiv.
2. The widely accepted period for the Holodomor is 1932–33, but our research shows that there were also famine-related
losses in 1934.
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losses or lost births are births that did not occur due to the famine, i.e., they would have occurred had there been 
no famine. In this article, we present estimates of  yearly direct Holodomor losses by oblast for urban and rural 
areas, and propose explanations for the differences found. 
While numerous studies have attempted to estimate Holodomor losses for Ukraine, estimates at the region-
al level are scarce. S. Kulchytskyi (2003) and S. Maksudov (2012) analyzed mortality differentials at the oblast 
level, and Wheatcroft and Garnaut (2013) did the same at the raion level. However, these studies were based on 
registered deaths and did not attempt to estimate direct or indirect losses. Estimation of  regional Holodomor 
losses is important for several reasons. First, it shows that the average national and urban-rural estimates hide 
significant regional differences. Second, it quantifies the losses in each region. Third, these data provide the 
demographic underpinnings necessary for historical analyses of  the Holodomor and its consequences at the 
subnational level. Fourth, it helps us to better understand the dynamics of  the Holodomor and its consequences. 
The analysis presented here is based on our previous work on yearly estimates of  direct Holodomor losses in 
Ukraine, by urban and rural areas and by age and sex (Rudnytskyi et al. 2015), and on a discussion of  regional dif-
ferences in direct Holodomor losses that is based on maps posted as part of  ‘The Great Famine’ component of  
the Mapa: Digital Atlas of  Ukraine program developed by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (Plokhy 2016).
Oblast losses are presented without age and sex detail, mainly because estimates by age at the oblast level are 
based on relatively small numbers of  registered deaths, which affects reliability. We provide a brief  discussion of  
urban losses, but the emphasis is on rural losses. The dynamics of  urban excess deaths are quite different from 
rural dynamics, and require a separate analysis. Estimates of  oblast urban and rural losses are adjusted to the 
national urban and rural estimates presented in our previous work.
The loss estimates cover the administrative structure of  Soviet Ukraine at the time of  the famine, i.e., seven 
oblasts (Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa), and also the Moldavian 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). Our analysis shows distinct regional patterns in the spatial dis-
tribution of  the direct losses.
NOTE: The Moldavian ASSR is included in our analysis because it was part of  the Ukrainian SSR during 
the famine period. It was separated from Soviet Ukraine in 1940 and was not a part of  it thereafter. To simplify 
the presentation, in some cases we will refer in the text to ‘seven oblasts’ instead of  ‘eight regions.’
Changes in administrative-territorial structure
Our estimation of  losses is based on reconstruction of  yearly populations for the eight regions of  the 
Ukrainian SSR during the 1926–39 intercensal period. Several changes in the administrative structure during 
this interval had to be taken into account. The country was divided into 40 districts called okrugs 3 during the 
1926–30 period; then the province-type oblasts were created to replace them, increasing progressively in number 
from 7 in 1932 to 15 in 1939. Also, an additional structure of  six economic-geographical areas was in place dur-
ing 1924–31 (Polissia, Right Bank, Left Bank, Dnipropetrovsk, Mountain Region, and Steppe). Furthermore, the 
country was divided into constantly fluctuating county-type raions during the whole 1926–39 period. 
As all demographic data were recorded according to the administrative structure in place at the time of  
their collection, it was necessary to recalculate the data from different years to the seven-oblast-plus-Moldavia 
structure that was current during the 1932–34 famine period. 
Recalculation of  data into the seven-oblast structure
The seven oblasts of  the Ukrainian SSR were in place between October 1932 and January 1937, and the 
territory of  the Moldavian ASSR did not change during the 1926–39 period; thus, it was necessary for us to es-
timate transition coefficients from the other administrative structures to the seven-oblast structure for the other 
years in the research period. These coefficients were applied in order to recalculate population by age and sex, 
3. The Russian term okrug (pl. okruga) has entered English usage and is therefore used here in roman type and pluralized
accordingly. The equivalent Ukrainian term is okruha (pl. okruhy). In 1930–2 the okrugs were abolished and, after a further
consolidation, replaced by oblasts.
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births, deaths, and migration data. In the end, specific transition coefficients were estimated for the following 
periods: 1926–28, 1929–31, 1937, 1938, and 1939.
1926–28: From 40 okrugs to seven oblasts 
Our transition coefficients from 40 okrugs to seven oblasts are based on detailed maps for the above-men-
tioned six economic areas that were published as part of  the 1926 census. These maps show raion and okrug 
borders and allowed us to construct the oblasts based on these smaller units. 
1929–31: From six economic-geographic zones to seven oblasts
Besides the normal tabulation by okrugs, the Central Statistical Administration of  Soviet Ukraine (CSA 
UkrSSR) tabulated vital statistics by six economic-geographic areas during 1924–31. As vital statistics were not 
available by okrugs for the 1929–31 period—only for the six areas—our recalculation of  vital statistics for this 
period was done in two steps: (1) estimation of  transition coefficients from the six economic-geographical areas 
to the 40 okrugs; and (2) use of  the transition coefficients estimated for the previous period, from the 40 okrugs 
to the seven oblasts. 
The years 1937, 1938, and 1939
Two sets of  transition coefficients were estimated for 1939: (1) for total populations—from 15 oblasts, 
as published for the 1939 census, to seven oblasts (Poliakov 1992; Korchak-Chepurkivskyi 1962); and (2) for 
populations by age and sex—from the 17-oblast structure in place in 1969 to seven oblasts (CSA USSR 1969). 
The first set of  coefficients was used to estimate total populations for each oblast, yearly births, deaths by age 
and sex, and net migration. The second set of  coefficients was used to estimate population by age and sex in 
1939. Transition coefficients from 15 to seven oblasts were based on populations by raion that were published in 
the 1939 census. A similar methodology was used to estimate transition coefficients for 1937, from 11 to seven 
oblasts (five oblasts were subsequently added to the seven oblasts, on 22 September 1937), and for 1938 from 12 
to seven oblasts. These coefficients were used to estimate population by age and sex for 1937, as well as births, 
deaths by age and sex, and net migration for 1937 and 1938.
Data and methods
Our reconstruction of  the yearly demographic dynamics of  the eight regions in the Ukrainian SSR for the 
1926–39 intercensal period was based on the following data: 1926, 1937, and 1939 population censuses, 1931 
urban count, rural-urban reclassification of  population settlements, yearly numbers of  births and deaths, and 
migration statistics.
Vital statistics are from the Russian State Archive of  the Economy (RSAE) and the personal archives of  the 
Ukrainian demographer Yuri Korchak-Chepurkivskyi. They include: (a) yearly births by sex, deaths by age and 
sex, and infant deaths by month of  death—for urban and rural areas in 1927–29 and 1933–38; (b) only total 
number of  births and deaths by sex for 1932; and (c) total number of  births and deaths only, with no details by 
sex or urban/rural subpopulations, for 1930–31 (CSA UkrSSR 1927–32; ANER 1933a; RSAE 1562/20/41, 43, 
46, 49, 59, 61, 62, 80, 86, 88, 121, 125, 153, 155; RSAE 1562/329/18, 20, 22, 33, 54, 56, 57, 114, 254, 261, 263, 
264). That is, we have full yearly series of  total number of  births and deaths for all UkrSSR oblasts by urban and 
rural areas; what is missing are selected detailed data by age and sex (as well as rural-urban breakdown) for 1930, 
1931, and 1932. It is important to note that complete birth and death data are available for the critical 1933 year. 
Migration was registered only in urban areas during the 1920s and 1930s. Thus, the following information 
was used in our analysis: (a) yearly net migration for 1927–38; (b) yearly number of  net migrants by sex and age 
and rural-urban migration streams for 1932–38 (RSAE 1562/20/22, 27, 29, 30, 38, 73, 75, 76, 118, 145). Our 
estimation of  rural migration was based on a detailed compilation of  various forced and voluntary migration 
streams from and to rural areas. 
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Estimation of  overall Holodomor losses was based on a detailed reconstruction of  the yearly populations in 
the eight regions during the 1926–39 period. The actual population dynamics were calculated by making relevant 
adjustments to census data, vital statistics, estimations of  migration, and urban-rural reclassifications; the yearly 
populations were then calculated based on these components. 
Adjustments of  the three Soviet censuses are described below. We also adjusted the official 1931 urban 
count for the Ukrainian SSR to compensate for the undercount of  children aged 0–4 years (ANER 1933b). The 
undercount for urban areas was distributed proportionately to the respective populations in the eight regions. 
After all the adjustments were made, we shifted populations from the dates of  the three censuses and the urban 
count to the closest January 1 date.
Adjustment of  1926, 1937, and 1939 censuses 
The 1926 and 1937 censuses are considered to be of  good quality; the 1939 census, on the other hand, was 
deliberately falsified to cover up the huge population losses due to the Holodomor and other repressive meas-
ures revealed by the 1937 census (Andreev et al. 1990; Tolts 1995; Zhiromskaia 1990). Before using their data, 
we needed to make minor adjustments to the 1926 and 1937 censuses and major adjustments to the 1939 census. 
These corrections were applied to the official urban and rural population figures of  the eight regions by sex and 
age, as published by the CSA USSR. The general methodology we used to make these adjustments is the same as 
the one we used in our previous work on Ukraine (Rudnytskyi et al. 2015); here we describe only the additional 
steps needed for adjustments at the regional level.
1926 census 
We made two adjustments to the official 1926 census figures (CSA USSR 1929): redistribution of  armed 
forces and adjustment of  under-reporting for children aged 0–4 years. The census counted military personnel at 
the garrisons where they were stationed—mostly located in urban areas—thus introducing a significant distor-
tion in the age structure of  the urban population. We estimated the total number of  armed forces stationed in 
the Ukrainian SSR at 121,200, by applying the proportion of  the civilian population in Ukraine to the total USSR 
civilian population, 19 per cent, to the total armed forces in the Soviet Union. This estimate was distributed in 
the eight regions, proportionately to their urban and rural populations. 
Our adjustment of  the undercount of  children aged 0–4 years was done using a methodology developed by 
Korchak-Chepurkivskyi (1928) for Ukraine. Adjustment coefficients were estimated for each region and were 
applied to the urban and rural areas of  the region. The overall average adjustment for Soviet Ukraine was 0.8 
per cent, with the following breakdown for the eight regions: 1.3 per cent in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts, 
1.2 per cent in Moldavia, 1.0 per cent in Donetsk oblast, 0.8 per cent in Kyiv oblast, 0.6 per cent in Kharkiv and 
Vinnytsia oblasts, and 0.5 per cent in Chernihiv oblast. 
1937 census
As stated in our paper on Ukraine (Rudnytskyi et al. 2015: 57):
The 1937 census was the first census conducted after the Great Famine, and it documented large population 
losses in Ukraine. It showed the total civilian population of  Ukraine to be significantly lower than projected 
by central planners (the Central Economic Survey Administration of  the USSR) and lower than in 1926. 
Given these unexpected results, the government declared the census ‘defective’ and its organizers were exe-
cuted or exiled (Tsaplin 1989; Volkov 1990). Some of  the 1937 census documents were destroyed, and the 
remaining results discredited because of  supposedly flawed methods and organizational failures. Only in the 
late 1980s did the data from the 1937 census become available (Poliakov 1992), and it was shown that the 
census was executed correctly (Tolts 1989; Volkov 1990; Livshits 1990).
Population data at the oblast level are available for the urban and rural areas by sex, but oblast data by age 
were never tabulated (Poliakov 2007). As with the 1926 Soviet census, we made two adjustments: redistribution 
of  armed forces and compensation of  census undercount. Estimation of  the armed forces in 1937 and their 
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distribution among the eight regions was done using the same methods as for the 1926 census. Thus, the total 
number of  armed forces in Ukraine in 1937 was estimated at 346,800, based on the proportion of  the civilian 
population in Ukraine relative to the USSR total. The undercount of  the 1937 census was estimated by Andreev 
et al. (1990) at 0.43 per cent for the whole Soviet Union. As we did not have elements for estimating undercount 
for Ukraine and its oblasts, the same percent was used for each oblast. 
1939 census 
It was discovered in 1990 that the 1939 census, considered for many years a model for Soviet censuses, was 
seriously flawed. A sophisticated falsification plan had been implemented to hide large population losses that 
were already documented in the 1937 census (Zhiromskaia 1990). Our adjustments to the census data at the 
regional level were made using the same methodology as the overall adjustments for Ukraine (Rudnytskyi et al. 
2015). They included the elimination of  two types of  falsification: (1) inflated undercount and inflated adjust-
ment factors for control forms; and (2) reassignment—to place of  residence at time of  census—of  the census 
forms of  persons in forced labour camps, “special groups,” and military personnel, which had been arbitrarily 
assigned to different parts of  Ukraine.
Table 1. Adjustment steps for 1939 census populations of Ukrainian SSR, by region (in 1,000s)
Region
Reported 
civilian 
population
Special subpopulations Corrections Adjusted census 
population  
= (2) + (3)  
+ (4) + (5)
+ (6) + (7)
Official 
census 
figures
% 
Adjust-
ment 
(8) / (9)
Army 
Civilian 
population 
related to 
NKVD
Groups1 
А, B, C
Correc-
tion for 
under-
count
Correc-
tion for 
control 
forms
Correc-
tion for 
‘unknown 
difference’ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Ukraine total 29,269.2 380.7 8.0 194.3 82.4 113.4 94.6 30,142.6 30,946.2 −2.6
Vinnytsia 3,967.1 51.6 0.5 12.9 4.6 15.3 12.8 4,064.8 4,193.0 −3.1
Kyiv 5,084.9 66.1 1.6 39.8 16.2 19.7 16.5 5,244.9 5,394.0 −2.8
Chernihiv 2,564.4 33.4 0.4 10.2 4.9 9.9 8.3 2,631.4 2,721.3 −3.3
Kharkiv 5,352.7 69.6 1.7 41.5 12.3 20.8 17.3 5,516.0 5,654.7 −2.5
Donetsk 4,704.4 61.2 1.1 25.9 27.4 18.2 15.2 4,853.4 4,941.4 −1.8
Dnipropetrovsk 3,662.9 47.6 0.9 21.4 8.7 14.2 11.8 3,767.5 3,871.4 −2.7
Odesa 3,358.5 43.7 1.6 40.0 2.2 13.1 10.9 3,470.0 3,571.3 −2.8
Moldavian ASSR 574.2 7.5 0.1 2.6 6.1 2.2 1.9 594.6 599.2 −0.8
1 A = NKVD; B = prisoners; C = forced resettlements
Sources: Poliakov (1991, 1992), Simchenko (1990), Kokurin and Petrov (2000), and authors’ calculations.
We redistributed the armed forces, estimated at 380,700 for the Ukrainian SSR, among the oblasts by 
rural and urban areas using the same methodology as in the 1926 and 1937 censuses. Next, data on “spe-
cial groups”—NKVD personnel, prisoners, and forced settlers—were available only for the whole country 
(Poliakov 1992). However, the distribution of  these special contingents by oblast and rural-urban areas was 
published in the 1937 census (Poliakov 1991), and we used these 1937 proportions to redistribute the total 
numbers of  special contingents in Ukraine by oblast in 1939. Data on the civilian NKVD staff  contingent, 
also available only for Soviet Ukraine overall, was distributed by oblast and rural-urban areas proportionately 
to the oblast distributions of  the special contingents. Comparing our resulting adjusted figures with the offi-
cial census figures, we arrived at an overall inflation factor for Ukraine of  2.6 per cent; at the oblast level, the 
inflation factors vary between 0.8 per cent for Moldavia to 3.3 per cent for Chernihiv oblast (see Rudnytskyi 
et al. 2015 for more details).
Our adjustment of  the 1939 populations by age and sex is based on official data published by the CSA USSR 
in 1969 and our transition coefficients from 17 to seven oblasts (see discussion in the previous section). These 
official data include 383,600 individual census records of  prisoners living outside the Ukrainian SSR that had 
been arbitrarily redistributed in the rural areas of  five oblasts in Ukraine—Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Odesa, Chernihiv, 
and Kharkiv—undoubtedly to artificially boost populations in rural areas that were decimated by the Holodo-
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mor (Simchenko 1990). As the official civilian population by age and sex contained these extra 383,600 prisoners 
residing outside Ukraine, we subtracted them from the rural populations of  the five oblasts, using the age-sex 
structure of  the labour camp populations (Kokurin and Petrov 2000).
Adjustment of  vital statistics for under-registration
Registered numbers of  births and deaths were distorted by different degrees of  under-registration during 
the intercensal period; during the famine years, levels of  under-registration reached extremely high proportions. 
The general adjustment approach used for urban and rural areas of  Soviet Ukraine is described in Rudnytskyi 
et al. (2015), and the same approach was used for each of  the eight regions. Only a brief  conceptual description 
of  the adjustment methodology is presented here.
We made adjustments along three dimensions: (1) crisis (1932–34) and non-crisis (1927–31 and 1935–39) 
periods; (2) urban, rural and total; and (3) three vital events: births, infant deaths, and deaths after one year of  
age. The adjustment methods for the three vital events differed, depending on the related dimension. Namely, 
the same adjustment methods were applied to the three events in urban areas during crisis and non-crisis per-
iods, while different methods were applied (to the three vital events) during crisis years for rural and total popu-
lations. In almost all cases, adjustments for rural areas were calculated as the difference between total and urban 
values. Ukrainian demographers did extensive research on this topic in the 1930s, and we took full advantage of  
their work in our adjustment methodology.
Estimation of  net migration by oblast, 1927–38
Migration is difficult to estimate, as migration statistics are incomplete and fragmentary. Estimation of  
migration for urban areas is less problematic than for rural areas, as there was a migration registration system 
in place in cities during this period, while no such system existed in rural areas. In 1932 the urban registration 
system was improved by the introduction of  registration cards for all arrivals and departures in most cities of  
Soviet Ukraine (Popov 1995). However, urban migration statistics are problematic, requiring systematic evalua-
tion and adjustments for under-registration. Rural migration estimates had to be pieced together using different 
statistical sources and archival documents. Once the yearly rural and urban migration was estimated for each 
region, the respective totals were adjusted to the yearly net migration data for urban and rural areas of  the 
Ukrainian SSR (Rudnytskyi et al. 2015). 
Urban migration 
The following data sources were used for estimating urban migration by oblast: (1) numbers of  net migrants 
for Ukraine, 12 separate oblasts and the Moldavian ASSR for 1927–38, compiled by ANER without sex, age, 
and flow details (RSAE 1562/20/73); and (2) number of  migrants by arrivals and departures, as well as net 
migrants, during 1933–38, by sex and age for all urban centers in each oblast (RSAE 1562/20/30, 38, 75, 75, 
18, 145). We also had migration data for 1932 by arrivals and departures by sex, age and migration flows (RSAE 
1562/20/27). The yearly numbers of  net migrants, calculated by ANER for the 1927–38 period and for 12 
oblasts, were recalculated by us for the seven oblasts using the appropriate transition coefficients. We then used 
these estimates of  net migrants as the basis for estimating yearly numbers of  urban migrants. 
Our estimation of  numbers of  net urban migrants in each oblast was done for three separate periods, 
1927–30, 1931–36, 1937–38, using the same method as for urban Ukraine (Rudnytskyi et al. 2015). Yearly 
disaggregation of  the net migrants was done proportionately to the yearly number of  registered net migrants. 
Thus, the total number of  net urban migrants for the 1927–38 period is 3,792,200 (see Table 2). 
Vinnytsia was the only oblast with negative net urban migration for the 1927–38 period. Migration was a 
significant factor in the urban growth of  Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, with total net migration equal 
to 159 per cent and 142 per cent of  their respective 1927 urban populations. For the other oblasts, this figure 
varied between 36 and 63 per cent; the contribution of  net migration to Moldavia’s urban growth was negligible.
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Rural migration 
We classified rural migration into two types of  streams: internal and external. The main internal stream 
is rural-to-urban migration for the 1927–38 period. According to the urban registration system, of  the total net 
urban migration about 81 per cent were rural-to-urban migrants, i.e., 3,085,800. We did a yearly distribution 
of  this total according to the yearly distribution of  rural-to-urban migrants in the urban registry system. 
Then, within each year we distributed the number of  migrants among the oblasts proportionately to their 
rural population size. 
The second internal stream is organized inter-oblast migration from rural to rural areas during 1934–35. Data on 
these migration streams can be found in Iefimenko (2013) and Iukhnovskyi et al. (2008). In 1934, 16,200 fam-
ilies were resettled from Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Chernihiv oblasts to Odesa, Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetro-
vsk oblasts; in 1935, 9,800 families were resettled from Vinnytsia and Kyiv oblasts to Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, 
and Kharkiv oblasts.
External rural migration is composed of  nine streams, seven out-migration and two in-migration streams: 
1. Persons sent to labour camps (gulags) and working colonies, 1929–38. Sources for these data are: Nikolskyi 2001;
Mozokhin nd; Zemskov 2005; and Tronko et al. 1994–2011; the total number of  prisoners is 284,600.
Detailed information on this type of  emigration by oblast is available for 1937 and 1938; about 90
per cent of  these migrants were males (Golotik and Minaev 2004). The 64,300 sent to penal camps in
1937–38 were distributed by oblast as follows: 24,200 in Vinnytsia, 10,700 in Kyiv, 8,200 in Donetsk,
6,300 in Kharkiv, 5,700 in Odesa, 5,200 in Dnipropetrovsk, 2,600 in Chernihiv, and 1,400 in Moldavia.
For the other years, 1929–36, reliable statistics are available only for Ukraine, and yearly estimates for
Ukraine were calculated in Rudnytskyi et al. (2015). These yearly numbers of  migrants were distributed
by oblast using the proportions available for 1937–38.
2. Eviction of  kulaks,4 1930–33. Data on this migration stream can be found in: SARF 9414/1/1943, 1944;
SARF 9479/1/2; Yakovlev et al. 2005; and Bugai 2013; the total number of  evicted kulaks is 364,500.
Detailed information on this migration is available for 1930 by 40 okrugs, and we recalculated the data
for the seven oblasts. The 111,400 kulaks evicted in 1930 are distributed by oblast as follows: 24,400 in
Odesa, 19,600 in Kharkiv, 18,100 each in Vinnytsia and Kyiv oblasts, 17,500 in Dnipropetrovsk, 7,200 in
Donetsk, 3,600 in Chernihiv, and 3,100 in Moldavia. Total numbers for 1931, 1932, and 1933 were only
available for Ukraine, and we redistributed them by oblast using the proportions from 1930. The yearly
totals of  evicted kulaks were 194,100 in 1931, 15,000 in 1932, and 44,000 in 1933.
3. Forced emigration of  peasants, 1929–33. Statistics on this migration category are fragmentary and unreliable,
as most of  it took place during the Holodomor (RSAE 1562/20/22, 29, 30, 73; Vynnychenko 1994).
The estimate is 532,200; yearly estimates were taken from Rudnytskyi et al. (2015), and numbers by
oblast were distributed proportionately to the respective rural populations.
4. Organized mass resettlements of  peasants, 1927–30. These resettlements were a continuation of  previous
campaigns to resettle peasants from Soviet Ukraine to Siberia and the Far East. A total of  120,000 were
resettled in 1927–30 (Hirshfeld 1930; Platunov 1976; Rybakovskii 1990). The yearly overall numbers of
migrants for Ukraine were distributed by oblast proportionately to their rural population.
5. Deportation of  Poles and Germans to Kazakhstan in 1936. From areas in Vinnytsia and Kyiv oblasts bordering
Polish-occupied Galicia and Volhynia, 14,900 peasant families (or 60,000 persons) were deported in
1936 to Kazakhstan (Yakovlev et al. 2005; Bugai 2013; Iefimenko 2013). We distributed this number by
oblast proportionately to their rural populations.
6. Emigration of  Jews, 1929–38. An ethno-demographic balance methodology was used by Rudnytskyi et al.
(2015) to estimate the number of  Jews who emigrated from Ukraine during this period. The number of
4. The Russian term kulak has entered English usage and is therefore used here in roman type and pluralized accordingly.
The equivalent Ukrainian term is kurkul (pl. kurkuli ).
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Jewish emigrants thus estimated for the intercensal period was distributed yearly, based on information 
from the following sources: Hirshfeld 1930; Weitsblit 1930; Vynnychenko 1994; Leskova 2005; Rudnik 
2006. Approximately 57,000 Jews emigrated from Ukraine during this period, and this number was 
distributed among the oblasts, proportionately to the number of  Jews in each oblast.
7. Peasants hired to work on construction projects in other parts of  the Soviet Union, 1935–38. Information about this
migration stream is fragmentary (Kozin 1936; Vynnychenko 1994; RSAE 1562/20/73, 75, 76, 118, 143,
145). According to our calculations, about 170,500 peasants from Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Odesa
oblasts, as well as Moldavia, were involved in this state-run initiative. The yearly estimates calculated
in Rudnytskyi et al. (2015) were distributed proportionately to the rural population of  the oblasts and
Moldavian ASSR.
8. Resettlement of  peasants from Belarus and Russia to Ukraine during 1933–34. The 1932–34 famine left many
villages in Ukraine practically empty, and the Soviet government decided to settle these villages with
peasants from Belarus and Russia. Sources on these resettlements are: Iefimenko (2013) and CSANO
(1/2/6583–85, 6392). During the second half  of  1933 a total of  27,100 families (137,800 persons) were
resettled from Belarus and from the following four regions of  the RSFSR: Gorky (Nizhnii Novgorod)
Krai and Yaroslavl, Western, and Central Black Earth oblasts. They were resettled in the following
oblasts of  the UkrSSR: 44,300 in Kharkiv, 39,600 in Dnipropetrovsk, 34,600 in Odesa, and 19,300 in
Donetsk. However, a portion of  these settlements turned out to be temporary; Iefimenko presents data
that by March 1935, at least half  of  the settlement populations had left (2013: 143–48).
9. Resettlement of  kulaks from Central Asia to Ukraine in 1931. The policy of  destroying kulaks as a class was
not limited to the European regions of  the Soviet Union; it also affected wealthy farmers in Central
Asia. More than 40 villages in Odesa oblast were recipients of  peasants from Uzbekistan branded as
kulaks (Vynnychenko 1994; Smolii et al. 2003; Zemskov 2005). According to our calculations, this
contingent had about three thousand families (16,000 persons).
Our team systematized, evaluated, analyzed, and organized all these data into yearly numbers of  net migrants
by rural area in each oblast, resulting in −4,400,300 total net rural migrants. Net rural migration for the 1927–38 
period was negative for all oblasts. Dnipropetrovsk oblast had the largest net migration, with −1,017,300. Add-
ing net urban and rural migration, we obtained −608,100 net migrants for Ukraine (Table 2).
More detailed information discovered about urban-rural reclassification during our oblast estimates resulted 
in some changes in our total urban and rural net migration numbers compared to previous estimates for Ukraine 
(Levchuk et al. 2015; Rudnytskyi et al. 2015). The previous number of  4,108,000 net urban migrants changed to 
3,792,200, and the previous number of  −4,826,400 net rural migrants changed to −4,400,300. There were also 
minor adjustments to total number of  deaths, from 8,519,600 to 8,640,100 in rural areas, and from 1,650,000 
to 1,639,400 in urban areas, with a total of  10,279,500 deaths in Soviet Ukraine. These adjustments resulted 
in minor changes to the yearly balances of  urban and rural areas by oblast. As a result of  these changes, the 
number of  direct losses for urban areas decreased by 2 per cent, and the number of  direct losses for rural areas 
increased by 0.2 per cent; the total number of  direct losses remained the same. 
Population reconstruction by oblast, 1927–39
Our reconstruction of  yearly populations for urban and rural areas of  the eight regions was done in two 
steps: first for total population and then by age and sex. Having adjusted the census populations as well as 
numbers of  births, deaths, and net migration, we needed one more element to reconstruct the urban and rural 
populations for the seven oblasts and Moldavia—namely, rural-urban reclassifications. They were implemented 
in 1930, 1936, and 1938, were fairly extensive, and had significant implications for the sizes of  the urban and 
rural areas in many oblasts.
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Table 2. Total population balance for Ukrainian SSR and its region, by urban-rural areas, 1927–38 (in 1,000s)
A – Total
Region Population on 1 Jan. 1927 Births Deaths
Net 
migration
Population on 
1 Jan. 1939
% annual 
natural rate
% annual 
total  rate
Ukraine total 29,316.3 11,685.0 10,279.5 −608.1 30,113.8 0.42 0.22
Vinnytsia 4,405.1 1,678.2 1,542.7 −486.3 4,054.3 0.29 −0.69
Kyiv 5,877.6 2,182.0 2,328.8 −495.4 5,235.4 −0.17 −0.96
Chernihiv 2,812.6 1,010.8 850.3 −339.6 2,633.5 0.49 −0.55
Kharkiv 5,784.4 2,074.7 2,195.0 −159.2 5,504.9 −0.14 −0.41
Donetsk 3,007.5 1,746.8 1,128.6 1,221.1 4,846.9 1.57 3.98
Dnipropetrovsk 3,548.9 1,509.6 1,077.8 −203.2 3,777.6 0.98 0.52
Odesa 3,302.7 1,220.4 950.9 −103.1 3,469.1 0.68 0.41
Moldavian ASSR 577.5 262.5 205.4 −42.4 592.2 0.82 0.21
B – Urban
Region Population on 1 Jan. 1927 Births Deaths
Net 
migration
Urban–rural 
reclassification
Population on 
1 Jan. 1939
% annual 
natural rate
Ukraine total 5,322.4 2,463.2 1,639.4 3,792.2 1,103.6 11,041.8 1.20
Vinnytsia 537.2 154.7 104.4 −28.9 −18.8 539.2 0.75
Kyiv 1,065.5 321.2 250.1 376.8 2.2 1,515.1 0.54
Chernihiv 344.5 101.0 75.7 215.9 −138.9 447.0 0.59
Kharkiv 981.5 357.2 261.8 585.6 238.4 1,900.8 0.77
Donetsk 942.8 889.3 521.1 1,498.2 760.6 3,570.7 2.75
Dnipropetrovsk 573.4 357.8 210.5 814.1 204.8 1,740.5 1.91
Odesa 797.8 251.8 198.5 328.3 27.3 1,206.3 0.54
Moldavian ASSR 79.6 30.1 17.3 2.1 27.9 122.3 1.24
C – Rural
Region Population on 1 Jan. 1927 Births Deaths
Net  
migration
Urban-rural 
reclassification
Population on 
1 Jan. 1939
% annual 
natural rate
Ukraine total 23,994.0 9,221.8 8,640.1 −4,400.3 −1,103.6 19,071.8 0.20
Vinnytsia 3,867.9 1,523.5 1,438.2 −457.5 18.8 3,514.4 0.18
Kyiv 4,812.1 1,860.8 2,078.7 −872.2 −2.2 3,719.7 −0.39
Chernihiv 2,468.1 909.8 774.6 −555.5 138.9 2,186.6 0.44
Kharkiv 4,802.9 1,717.5 1,933.2 −744.8 −238.4 3,604.1 −0.38
Donetsk 2,064.8 857.5 607.6 −277.1 −760.6 1,277.0 0.95
Dnipropetrovsk 2,975.6 1,151.8 867.3 −1,017.3 −204.8 2,037.9 0.76
Odesa 2,504.8 968.6 752.4 −431.4 −27.3 2,262.3 0.69
Moldavian ASSR 497.9 232.4 188.1 −44.5 −27.9 469.8 0.71
In 1930 the CSA UkrSSR approved a new classification of  urban settlements, with significant differences 
compared to the classification used for the 1926 census. In most oblasts, many urban settlements were reclassi-
fied as rural settlements. Criteria used in this reclassification were: small population size and high percentage of  
the population in agriculturally related occupations. Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts were the exceptions to 
this pattern, where many rural settlements were reclassified as urban settlements. The net result of  rural-urban 
reclassifications in 1930 was an increase in the rural population by 194,100. 
Subsequently, in preparation for the 1937 and 1939 censuses, new rounds of  rural-urban reclassification 
were implemented in 1936 and 1938. In both cases, the reclassification was in one direction for all oblasts, from 
rural to urban, and it was quite extensive. In 1936 the reclassification process increased the urban population 
of  Ukraine by 1,077,700, and in 1938 by 219,900. Two-thirds of  these increases occurred in Donetsk and Dni-
propetrovsk oblasts (ANER 1933b; UCEC 1933, 1936; CANER 1936; SS USSR 1938, 1939). 
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Final reconstructed total populations of  the eight regions for 1927 and 1939 are presented in Table 2. 
During the intercensal period, the Ukrainian SSR had an overall annual average natural exponential growth rate 
(births minus deaths) of  0.4 per cent. Two oblasts, Kyiv and Kharkiv, lost population, while the other oblasts 
had an annual average natural growth rate of  less than one per cent, except Donetsk, with a yearly rate of  1.6 
per cent. 
The urban population of  Ukraine grew at an annual average natural growth rate of  1.2 per cent, and urban 
areas in all oblasts had positive growth. Donetsk had the highest annual average natural growth rate, with 2.7 
per cent, followed by Dnipropetrovsk oblast with 1.9 per cent and Moldavia with 1.2. For the other oblasts, 
rates varied between 0.5 and 0.8 per cent. The average annual natural rate of  growth for all rural areas was only 
0.2 per cent, and Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts had negative yearly natural growth of  −0.4 per cent each. For all the 
other oblasts, the yearly natural rate of  growth was positive, albeit quite small. 
Direct Holodomor losses
Direct losses are estimated as the difference between the number of  deaths occurring during the famine 
years, and the hypothetical number of  deaths had there been no famine during the same period. We estimated 
the number of  hypothetical deaths had there been no famine using linearly extrapolated age-specific deaths rates 
between 1931 and 1935, i.e., years before and after the famine, at a time when mortality was considered ‘normal.’
Our results for direct losses by oblast are presented in Table 3 in three panels: total, urban, and rural.  The 
total number of  direct losses for Ukraine is estimated at 3.9 million, with 250,000 in 1932, 3,529,000 in 1933, 
and 163,000 in 1934 (panel A). Most of  the losses occurred in 1933 in all oblasts. In five oblasts, 90 per cent or 
more of  the losses occurred in 1933, and the percentages for Donetsk and Chernihiv oblasts and Moldavia are 
76, 81, and 85, respectively.
Kyiv oblast had the highest number of  losses with 1,111,000, followed by Kharkiv with 1,038,000 and 
Vinnytsia with 546,000. Direct losses for Chernihiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts vary between 
254,000 and 368,000, and Moldavia has the smallest number of  direct losses, 68,000.
As the number of  losses is directly related to population size, to make valid comparisons among oblasts it 
is necessary to control for population size. Focusing first on 1933, the total number of  excess deaths for Soviet 
Ukraine in 1933 is 119 deaths per 1,000 population. Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts have the highest losses, with 179 
excess deaths per 1,000 population each, followed by Vinnytsia oblast with 115 and Moldavia with 102; Donetsk 
oblast has the lowest value, 41 direct losses per 1,000 population. The relative number of  losses for Ukraine was 
lower in 1934 than in 1932, and this is the case for all except Chernihiv oblast, where relative losses were higher 
in 1934 than in 1932. 
The ratios in the last column provide a summary of  relative losses for the three famine years, calculated as 
the total number of  losses for the three years, divided by the 1933 mid-year population and multiplied by 1,000. 
If  we divide this indicator by 10, it can be used as an approximation of  the per cent of  the 1933 population that 
died due to famine. Thus, we can say that the total number of  excess deaths constituted about 13 per cent of  
the 1933 UkrSSR population; Kyiv oblast had the highest value with 20 per cent, and Donetsk oblast had the 
lowest with 5 per cent.
The total urban excess deaths in Soviet Ukraine were 293,000, with 49,000 in 1932, 194,000 in 1933 and 
51,000 in 1934 (Table 3, panel B); 66 per cent of  all urban excess deaths occurred in 1933. Regarding excess 
deaths per 1,000 population, the yearly ratios are 7.0, 26.8, and 6.9 respectively, and almost 40 for the 1932–34 
period. The concentration of  urban direct losses in 1933 varies from around 80 per cent in Kharkiv and Odesa 
oblasts to 41 per cent in Donetsk oblast.
Of  the total 3.9 million excess deaths, 3.6 million occurred in rural areas, and 91 per cent of  them occurred 
in 1933. This high concentration of  rural excess deaths in 1933 is found in all oblasts, from 82 per cent in 
Chernihiv oblast to 94 per cent in Kharkiv oblast. Yearly direct losses per 1,000 population are 8.3, 149.4, and 
5.5, totalling almost 164 for the 1932–34 period. 
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Discussion
This section is based on the discussion of  regional differences of  Holodomor direct losses posted on the 
website Mapa: Digital Atlas of  Ukraine (Plokhy 2016). We systematized and quantified arguments presented in 
that paper, and elaborated the discussion with new elements.
As indicated above, the Holodomor dynamic in urban areas is very different from the one in rural areas 
and requires a separate, more detailed analysis. We present here a brief  discussion of  the urban losses, and then 
proceed to analyze in detail the spatial distribution of  the rural direct losses. 
Spatial distribution of  excess deaths in urban areas
Research on the Holodomor has focused mainly on rural areas; our research shows that urban areas were 
also significantly affected by this famine. Relative 1932–34 direct losses represent 6.9 per cent and 6.2 per cent 
Table 3. Direct losses (excess deaths) from the Holodomor in Ukrainian SSR, in numbers and by 1,000 
population, by region and rural-urban areas
A – Total
Region Thousands   Per 1,000 population   1932      1933    1934 1932−34    1932    1933    1934 1932–34*
Ukraine total 250.0 3529.2 163.3 3942.5 8.0 119.3 5.9 133.3
Vinnytsia 27.0 497.3 21.1 545.5 5.9 114.6 5.2 125.6
Kyiv 83.9 991.5 35.4 1110.8 13.7 178.7 7.0 200.3
Chernihiv 17.6 205.4 31.2 254.2 6.0 73.7 11.9 91.3
Kharkiv 46.9 969.9 20.8 1037.6 7.8 178.9 4.2 191.4
Donetsk 28.7 175.2 26.9 230.8 7.0 41.1 6.4 54.2
Dnipropetrovsk 20.6 331.3 16.5 368.4 5.4 91.6 4.7 101.9
Odesa 19.6 300.3 7.0 326.9 6.1 98.8 2.4 107.6
Moldavian ASSR 5.7 58.2 4.4 68.3 9.6 102.4 8.1 120.2
B – Urban
Region Thousands    Per 1,000 population   1932      1933 1934 1932–34    1932     1933    1934 1932–34*
Ukraine total 48.8 193.9 50.6 293.4 7.0 26.8 6.9 39.7
Vinnytsia 3.1 14.6 2.0 19.7 7.6 35.8 5.0 48.4
Kyiv 11.2 44.4 1 65.8 11.5 46.7 10.5 69.2
Chernihiv 2.6 11.1 3.8 17.4 9.0 39.6 13.7 62.4
Kharkiv 6.2 45.7 5.0 56.9 5.0 36.3 4.0 45.3
Donetsk 15.2 24.1 19.6 58.9 7.3 10.4 8.4 25.6
Dnipropetrovsk 5.0 23.3 7.1 35.4 5.0 22.7 6.7 34.5
Odesa 4.7 29.0 2.8 36.6 5.0 30.7 3.0 38.7
Moldavian ASSR 0.7 1.9 0.0 2.7 9.3 24.5 0.4 34.4
C – Rural
Region Thousands     Per 1,000 population   1932    1933   1934 1932–34    1932    1933    1934 1932–34*
Ukraine total 201.2 3335.3 112.7 3649.1 8.3 149.4 5.5 163.7
Vinnytsia 23.9 482.8 19.1 525.7 5.7 122.7 5.2 133.6
Kyiv 72.7 947.1 25.2 1045.1 14.2 206.0 6.2 227.3
Chernihiv 15.0 194.4 27.4 236.8 5.7 77.6 11.7 94.5
Kharkiv 40.8 924.2 15.7 980.7 8.6 222.0 4.3 235.6
Donetsk 13.4 151.2 7.3 171.9 6.6 77.3 3.8 87.9
Dnipropetrovsk 15.6 308.0 9.3 333.0 5.5 118.9 3.8 128.5
Odesa 14.9 271.2 4.2 290.3 6.5 129.6 2.1 138.7
Moldavian ASSR 5.0 56.3 4.4 65.7 9.6 114.7 9.4 133.7
Note: Summary indicator * represents total number of direct losses in 1932–34/1933 mid-year population.
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of  the urban populations in Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts, respectively, while in the other oblasts they vary be-
tween 2.6 per cent in Donetsk and 4.5 per cent in Vinnytsia oblasts (Table 3). 
Rural losses are expected to be always higher than urban losses. However, we see that urban losses are higher 
than rural losses in 1934, namely, 6.9 and 5.5 per 1,000 persons, respectively. This surprising result can be ex-
plained by considering the systemic relationship between urban and rural areas during the Holodomor. 
As a result of  the Soviet government’s policy to control agricultural production through the collectivization 
of  farms, the state assumed direct responsibility for providing food to the urban population. Due to increasing 
shortages of  food in cities, in 1931 the Politburo approved the resolution ‘On the introduction of  a single sys-
tem of  supply for the working population by ration books.’ Key elements this resolution and its consequences 
are described as follows (emphasis added):
Only those who worked in the state sector of  the economy (industrial factories, state and military organiza-
tions and departments, and state farms) and their families received ration cards. Peasants and the politically 
disenfranchised were left out of  the state food supply system. These people made up more than 80 per cent 
of  the total population. Even ration sizes depended on how important people were to the industrialization 
process… From the beginning of  1931 there were four types of  rations throughout the country: special, first, 
second, and third. They were called city lists, but in reality they were groupings of  enterprises and organizations, 
because factories in the same city could be on different supply lists. The special and first lists had priority 
and included key industries in Moscow, Leningrad, Baku, the Donbas, Karaganda, Eastern Siberia, the Far 
East, and the Urals. Constituting only 40 per cent of  the total number of  people on rations, they received 
nearly 80 per cent of  all the food supplies. The second and third lists included smaller and non-industrial 
cities’ (Osokina 2001: 61–62).
The ration system was affected by two opposite processes during the famine years: a rapid increase of  the 
urban population triggered by Stalin’s industrialization policy, and diminishing food production due to peasant 
opposition to collectivization and increasing mismanagement of  the agricultural sector (Levchuk et al. 2015). 
The result was a gradual diminishing of  the official food ration amounts, especially on the lower ration lists; 
thus, an increasing proportion of  the urban population ended up without any food assistance. By 1934, starva-
tion reached critical levels in many cities, resulting in higher relative excess deaths in urban than in rural areas. 
Spatial distribution of  excess deaths in rural areas
In this section we discuss different factors that may explain the variable and unexpected regional distribu-
tion of  direct losses caused by the Holodomor, as shown in Map 1.
We start by presenting four hypotheses that have been suggested for the expected distribution of  losses. 
Next, as the number of  excess deaths experienced a drastic change between 1932 and 1933, we first examine 
factors related to the onset of  the famine and regional distribution of  direct losses in 1932. At the end of  1932, 
the north-central oblasts of  the Ukrainian SSR had lower levels of  collectivization and higher levels of  grain 
quota fulfillment than the southern oblasts. This apparent contradiction leads us to examine, in the third sec-
tion, the resistance to collectivization and grain procurement, and the repression of  this resistance by the Soviet 
government. The explosion of  excess deaths during the first half  of  1933, and its relationship with the food 
‘assistance’ program, are examined in the fourth section.
Four hypotheses
Several hypotheses have been suggested to explain the spatial variation in levels of  excess deaths in rural 
areas of  Ukraine: historical, ecological, border, and economic. 
Historical hypothesis. The 1921–23 famine affected the southern grain-growing regions of  Ukraine, and it was 
natural to assume that the 1932–34 famine would also have a more pronounced effect on these regions (Plokhy 
2016: 378). As can be seen on Map 1, this was not the case for the 1932–34 famine; the highest losses are found 
in the north-central oblasts of  Kyiv and Kharkiv.
Ecological hypothesis. Ukraine can be divided into three natural zones: mixed forest or Polissia, forest-steppe, 
and steppe. Polissia is covered with forests and wetlands and has rich natural vegetation, the steppe region is a 
vast plain covered with grass and little or no trees, and the forest-steppe zone is a transition zone, with forests 
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in the north and steppes in the south. According to the ecological hypothesis, the expectation is that the relative 
number of  excess deaths should be lowest in the Polissia zone and highest in the steppe zone. The rationale is 
that once most of  the grain, and in many cases all food, was confiscated by the Soviet government, people in 
Polissia could find some food in the forests and swamps, while no alternative food was to be found in the steppe 
zone. Losses in the forest-steppe zone are expected to be in the middle range.
59
Map 1. Number of rural excess deaths per 100 population by oblast, Ukrainian SSR, 1932–34.
60
Map 2. Number of rural excess deaths per 1,000 population by raion, Ukrainian SSR, 1932–34.
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Unfortunately, the seven-oblast administrative structure of  the Ukrainian SSR at that time does not provide 
a clear picture of  the situation in the ecological zones, as they cut across oblast borders. However, detailed vital 
statistics available for 1933 allow us to estimate excess deaths at the raion level for that year, and Map 2 provides 
the resulting details. It is clear from this map that the ecological hypothesis does not explain the regional varia-
tions in levels of  excess deaths, as the highest relative direct losses are mainly in the forest-steppe zone, not in 
the steppe zone.
Border hypothesis. Map 2 also shows that the relative number of  direct losses becomes lower the closer one 
gets to the international borders of  Kyiv, Vinnytsia, and Moldavia with Poland and Romania. This pattern is 
consistent with the border hypothesis formulated by Shlyakhter (ch. 10, p. 1–2):
Exploring some of  the striking regional variations in the famine’s severity, this paper argues that these dif-
ferences resulted from a combination of  official policies and the survival strategies of  border strip inhabit-
ants… In addition to offering an explanation for the lower mortality in Ukraine’s border districts during 
the Holodomor, this analysis also views the famine as a window onto Soviet security and revealshowcasing 
policies in the border strip, peasant survival strategies, and the interplay between the two.
Economic hypothesis. Given the failure of  the ecological hypothesis to explain the spatial variations in excess 
deaths, Plokhy (2016: 379) suggests that ‘on the eve and in the course of  the Great Ukrainian Famine, environ-
mental factors influenced human actions, particularly government policies that eventually contributed to the 
death toll.’ Specifically, Moscow focused its attention on the grain-producing areas of  southern Ukraine, as they 
had the optimal capacity to produce the grain needed for the implementation of  Stalin’s policies, while other 
regions were left basically to their own devices. 
61
Map 3. Wheat growing areas of the Ukrainian SSR, 1937.
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Map 3 shows the distribution of  wheat growing areas in 1937, and it can be used as an approximation of  
grain growing areas in 1932–34. Major grain growing areas are located in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk 
oblasts and Moldavia, while only 10 per cent of  Chernihiv oblast is dedicated to grain crops. The agriculture of  
Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Vinnytsia oblasts is more diversified, with sugar beet, potatoes, and legumes besides grains. 
Thus, the policy of  favouring the southern oblasts makes economic sense. 
In a situation of  generalized agricultural crisis like the one in 1932 (see discussion below), decisions had 
to be made about the priorities of  resources, and Moscow’s more favourable treatment of  the grain-producing 
oblasts was expected to result in lower relative direct losses in these oblasts than in the rest of  the Ukrainian 
SSR. Comparing Maps 1 and 3, we see that this is only partially true. Although in general the southern oblasts 
have lower relative losses than the northern oblasts, there are exceptions. In the steppe zone, Donetsk oblast has 
significantly lower relative direct losses than Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Moldavia. In the forest-steppe zone, 
Vinnytsia oblast has much lower losses than Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts, and the level of  its losses is similar to 
that of  most oblasts in the steppe zone. Chernihiv oblast also does not conform to the economic hypothesis, as 
its relative direct loss is as low as in Donetsk oblast.
1932: Early manifestations of  the Famine
To better understand the reasons for the differences in relative direct losses among the different oblasts, it is 
necessary to examine separately what happened in 1932 and 1933, as the dynamics of  the Holodomor changed 
drastically between 1932 and 1933. 
Regional differences in rural direct losses were already present in 1932. Kyiv oblast had the highest number 
of  excess deaths per 1,000 population, with 14.2, followed by Moldavia with 9.6 and Kharkiv with 8.6; losses in 
the other oblasts vary between 5.5 and 6.6 excess deaths per 1,000 population (Table 3). Some of  the reasons for 
this situation are described in detail in a letter to Stalin from the head of  the Council of  People’s Commissars 
of  the Ukrainian SSR, Vlas Chubar, in June 1932, which is quoted by Plokhy (2016: 382):
The failure of  legume and spring crops in those raions, above all, was not taken into account, and the insuffi-
ciency of  those crops was made up with foodstuffs to fulfill the grain requisition plans. Given the overall im-
possibility of  fulfilling the grain requisition plan, the basic reason for which was the lesser harvest in Ukraine 
as a whole and the colossal losses incurred during the harvest (a result of  weak economic organization of  
the collective farms and their utterly inadequate management from the raions and from the center), a system 
was put in place of  confiscating all grain produced by individual farmers, including seed stocks, and almost 
complete confiscation of  all produce from the collective farms… In addition to grain procurements, the 
same methods were applied to potato and, especially, meat procurements.
The situation in Kharkiv oblast was no better. After his tour of  Kharkiv oblast, Hryhorii Petrovsky, head 
of  the Communist Party’s Central Executive Committee for the UkrSSR, wrote to Stalin in June 1932 that 
‘famine has engulfed a good part of  the countryside… It will take a month or a month and a half  for new grain 
to appear… This means that famine will intensify’ (Plokhy 2016: 383). In a list of  raions most affected by the 
famine, compiled by Party officials in Kharkiv in June 1932, Kyiv and Vinnytsia oblasts had 10 and 11 raions, 
respectively, while the number of  affected raions in the southern oblasts was much smaller. The critical situa-
tion in Kyiv and Kharkiv in 1932 is confirmed by the high relative direct losses in these two oblasts;5 the lower 
level in Vinnytsia oblast (an international border oblast) was likely due to the lower mortality in the border areas 
(border oblast).
A key factor at the beginning of  the famine was the grain procurement plan for 1932 (Table 4). It docu-
ments the expectations of  the Soviet government regarding Ukraine’s contribution to Stalin’s overall procure-
ment plan, and provides a fairly good understanding of  the conditions in the different oblasts. The total 1932 
quota for the Ukrainian SSR was 5,831,000 tons of  grain. This target seems reasonable, as it constituted 90 per 
cent of  the amount collected from the 1931 crop. The relative allocation of  this quota among the different 
5. Although we were not able to find official documents about the situation in Moldavia, the high losses estimated are
consistent with the fact that repeated allotments of  food were provided for this autonomous republic starting as early as
March 1932 (RSASH 17/167/35, List 4: #44, #72).
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oblasts favoured the forest-steppe oblasts of  Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Vinnytsia, at the expense of  the steppe oblasts. 
Compared to what was collected in 1931, the amounts allocated to the steppe oblasts are higher than to the 
forest-steppe oblasts. The plan also takes into account the mixed-crop composition of  the forest-steppe zone, 
with much higher allocations to these crops for the oblasts in this zone than for the oblasts in the steppe zone. 
It also acknowledges the fact that the proportion of  independent farmers was much higher in the forest-steppe 
than in the steppe zone, and their grain quotas are much higher in the former than the latter.
The official procurement plan corroborates, at a more general level, Chubar’s impressions about the situation 
in Kyiv and Vinnytsia oblasts. It provides credence to Chubar’s statement that the unexpected failure of  the non-
grain crops and the heavy reliance of  the official grain procurement plan on these crops had dire consequences. 
The crop failure led to widespread famine in the forest-steppe zone, forcing the government to confiscate most 
of  the grain at kolkhozes and impose even harsher confiscation measures on individual farmers.
The extreme famine conditions in many areas of  the forest-steppe zone, and to a lesser degree in the steppe 
zone, forced the Ukrainian SSR government in Kharkiv 6 to petition repeatedly for some relief  from the grain 
procurement quotas. After strong resistance, Stalin had to accept reality, and grain procurement quotas were re-
duced three times during 1932: two significant reductions in August and October, and a more modest reduction 
at the end of  the year. 
Table 5. Successive reductions of 1932 grain quotas for Ukrainian SSR, by region
 Original quota % reduction January 1933 quota
Region million poods
%
distr.
August 
1932 
October 
1932
January 
1933
million 
poods
% overall
reduction
%
 distr.
Ukraine total 356 100 11 25 29 210 41 100
Vinnytsia 39 11 23 12 0 26.5 32 13
Kyiv 31 9 35 30 0 14 54 7
Kharkiv 74 21 11 41 3.4 35.5 52 17
Dnipropetrovsk 88 25 4.5 20 12 55.5 37 26
Odesa 84 24 2.3 17 12 56 33 27
Donetsk 36 10 14 33 2 19 47 9
Moldavian ASSR 4 1 12 22 0 3 29 1
Note: Chernihiv oblast was created later in 1932.
Source: Pyrih 2007: 242, 298, 303–04, 355–56, 601–02.
The first round of  reductions favoured heavily the forest-steppe zone at the expense of  the steppe zone. 
Kyiv oblast received the largest reduction, with 35 per cent, followed by Vinnytsia oblast with 23 per cent and 
6. Kharkiv was the capital of  the Ukrainian SSR until 1934.
Table 4. Grain procurement quotas for Ukrainian SSR in 1932, by region
1932 grain procurement quotas
 Region
1932 grain 
procurement 
quotas, % of 
1931 quota
tons
% of other 
crops (non-
grain and 
forage)
% of quota for 
independent 
farmers
Ukraine total 90.0 5,831,000 9.7 17.1
Vinnytsia 88.0 639,000 22.4 40.2
Kyiv 65.5 511,000 26.0 41.1
Kharkiv 74.5 1,212,000 11.9 23.8
Dnipropetrovsk 90.0 1,441,000 5.3 6.8
Odesa 140.0 1,376,000 1.7 6.7
Donetsk 95.0 583,000 7.4 5.1
Moldavian ASSR 46.0 69,000 2.9 30.4
Note: Chernihiv oblast was created later in 1932.
Source: Pyrih 2007: 242.
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Kharkiv with 11 per cent, while reductions for Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts were in the 2.3–4.5 per cent 
range. Donetsk oblast received a reduction of  14 per cent, significantly higher compared to the other two steppe 
oblasts; this was repeated also during the next round of  reductions. (The special status of  Donetsk oblast will 
be further discussed below.) During the second round of  reductions, Kharkiv and Kyiv again received large 
reductions, which prompted the steppe oblasts to demand significant reductions as well.
Overall, the grain procurement quota for the Ukrainian SSR was reduced by 41 per cent. Kyiv and Kharkiv 
oblasts had their original quotas reduced by more than half, and Vinnytsia oblast by one-third. The reduction for 
Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts was about one-third, and for Donetsk oblast it was close to half.
Table 6. Percent fullfillment of grain quotas by region in Ukrainian SSR, as of 1 Jan. 1933
Region Kolkhozes Sovkhozes Independent farmers       Total
% collectivized 
as of 1 Oct. 1932
Ukraine total 78 86 72 77 69
Chernihiv 92 96 68 78 47
Vinnytsia 100 95 100 100 59
Kyiv 100 101 90 100 67
Kharkiv 85.5 92 44 77 72
Dnipropetrovsk 70 82 54 69.5 85
Odesa 73 70 57 72 84
Donetsk 76 77 85 76 84
Moldavian ASSR 89 40.5 108 93 68
Sources: Pyrih 2007: 571–72; ANER 1935: 205.
The grain quota fulfillment results and collectivization levels shown in Table 6 are surprising, if  not puz-
zling. By October 1932 the steppe oblasts had reached very high levels of  collectivization, while levels of  col-
lectivization in the forest-steppe and Chernihiv oblasts were significantly lower. In contrast, by the end of  1932 
Kyiv and Vinnytsia had fulfilled 100 per cent of  the grain procurement quotas, and Kharkiv close to 80 per cent, 
while the average for the forest oblasts was around 75 per cent. The collectivization levels are consistent with 
the official objective of  faster collectivization of  the grain-producing steppe region. The grain quota fulfillment 
data merit a more detailed analysis. 
Fulfillment data is available for three groups: kolkhoz, sovkhoz,7 and independent farmers. For the kolhozes and 
sovkhozes, per cent fulfillment is similar for all oblasts within each zone; per cent fulfillment is higher among 
the forest-steppe zone oblasts than among the steppe zone oblasts. The differences between the forest-steppe 
and steppe oblasts are mainly due to the performance of  the independent farmers. Although independent 
farmers fulfilled over half  of  their quotas in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa, and 85 per cent in Donetsk, this had 
little impact on the overall quota, due to the small proportion of  independent farmers in these oblasts. The low 
performance of  Kharkiv oblast, on the other hand, is due exclusively to the very low output fulfillment per cent 
from the independent farmers. 
Resistance and repressions in 1932
Why is it that in spite of  their relatively lower level of  collectivization, the forest-steppe oblasts of  Soviet 
Ukraine, except the independent farmers in Kharkiv oblast, show such extraordinary levels of  compliance with 
the grain requisition plan? One possible answer is that these oblasts had been granted substantial reductions in 
their grain quotas (Table 5). Another possibility is the ‘ruthless efficiency of  the local Party machine in requi-
sitioning grain from the peasantry’ in Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts, as a reaction to active and passive resistance 
(Plokhy 2016: 389).
7. The Russian terms kolkhoz (collective farm) and sovkhoz (state farm or plantation) have entered English usage and are
therefore used here in roman type and pluralized accordingly. The equivalent Ukrainian terms are kolhosp and radhosp.
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Table 7. Selected indicators of resistance and repression in Soviet Ukraine during the 
Holodomor, by region
Region
number of petitions  
to leave kolkhozes registered‘terror’ 
acts
fines in kind # brigades 
requisitioning 
grain from 
indep. farmers
number
% fines 
of indep. 
farmers
individ- 
uals farms raions
(1) (2) (3) (4)* (5)* (6) (7)
Ukraine total 14,095 475 111 73 1,791 n/a n/a
Vinnytsia 5,800 219 42 75 150 90 51
Kyiv 3,320 75 21 79 70 99 65
Kharkiv 3,892 137 36 81 658 123** 84
Dnipropetrovsk 269 17 5 49 263 90 19
Odesa 191 7 4 94 344 97 24
Donetsk – n.d. – 38 14 59 26
Moldavian ASSR 623 20 3 126 291 7 0
Notes: Chernihiv oblast is not listed as it was created in 1932 and some indicators are missing;
* indicators standardized by size of oblast’s rural population; (1)…(3) June 1932;
(4) 1 Jan. 1932–31 Jan. 1933; (5)–(6) 5 Dec. 1932;
(7) 5 Dec. 1932; ** error in original data
Source: Pyrih 2007: 250, 445, 456, 631.
The following factors of  resistance and repression are quantified in Table 7: exodus from the kolkhozes, 
acts of  ‘terror,’ total fines, including in kind and percentage of  independent farmers fined, and number of  Com-
munist Party grain-search ‘brigades.’ The flight from kolkhozes was quite extensive in the forest-steppe oblasts, 
but negligible in the steppe oblasts. While the relative number (standardized by the rural population of  each 
oblast) of  registered acts of  ‘terror’ was very high in Odesa oblast, on average this indicator was higher in the 
forest-steppe than in the steppe oblasts.
The picture regarding number of  fines in kind, also standardized by the rural population in each oblast, is 
less clear-cut. This indicator was extremely high in Kharkiv oblast, quite low in Vinnytsia and Kyiv, and very low 
in Donetsk oblast. In all oblasts except Donetsk, the great majority of  fines in kind were applied to independent 
farmers. 
On 11 November 1932, the Central Committee of  the Communist Party of  the Ukrainian SSR ordered the 
creation by December 1 of  at least 1,000 brigades to search for hidden grain among the independent farmers. 
The proposed number of  brigades was much higher for the forest-steppe oblasts than for the steppe oblasts: 
200, 300, and 350 for Vinnytsia, Kharkiv, and Kyiv oblasts, respectively, and 50 each for the three steppe oblasts; 
these proportions are maintained when the numbers are standardized by the rural population of  each oblast. 
The higher number of  brigades for the forest-steppe oblasts was due, in part, to the fact that these oblasts had 
more independent farmers. The very high percentage of  grain procurement quotas for independent farmers 
in Vinnytsia and Kyiv oblasts (Table 4), and the fact that independent farmers in these oblasts had the highest 
percent fulfillment of  these quotas (Table 6), tend to support the ‘ruthless efficiency’ argument.
Further evidence about the more aggressive grain requisition practices in Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts during 
1932 is provided in a report on the fulfillment of  seed grain quotas for the 1933 harvest. As of  10 December 
1932, only 20.5 per cent and 16.5 per cent of  the quotas were filled in Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts, respectively, 
while 40 per cent of  the quota was filled in Dnipropetrovsk, 28 per cent in Donetsk, and 22 per cent in Ode-
sa oblasts. These numbers support the hypothesis that most of  the grain was already taken away in Kyiv and 
Kharkiv oblasts due to more aggressive requisition, while there was still a fair amount of  grain left in the steppe 
oblasts. More updated data for Kharkiv oblast tends to confirm this hypothesis. Namely, it was reported that 
by 15 February 1933, only 35.6 per cent of  the seed grain quota was fulfilled, and that the campaign was facing 
strong resistance (Pyrih 2007: 697).
The data tend to support the hypothesis that there was higher resistance to collectivization and grain pro-
curements in the forest-steppe oblasts, especially in Kyiv and Kharkiv, than in the steppe oblasts, and that these 
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oblasts were consequently subject to harsher repressions. The evidence may not be conclusive, as there is no 
certainty that the documents found so far are representative of  the total picture in each oblast. Nevertheless, 
they show a correlation that is quite suggestive.
1933: Famine as terror 
The number of  relative rural losses presented in Map 1 is for the whole 1932–34 period. As 90 per cent 
of  all losses occurred in 1933, the level of  these losses is determined to a great extent by what happened in 
that year. In rural areas, two processes were happening in 1933: (1) extraordinary increase in monthly registered 
deaths during the first 6–7 months (Wolowyna 2013); and (2) implementation of  a food aid program by Moscow 
as a reaction to this critical situation. 
Between January and June 1933, the number of  registered rural deaths increased by 11 times in Kyiv and 
Kharkiv oblasts, and eightfold in Vinnytsia oblast; in Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk oblasts the in-
creases ranged from fourfold to sevenfold, and in Moldavia rural registered deaths increased by half. These 
extraordinary increases were the result of  several measures implemented by the Soviet government in late 
1932 and early 1933.
First, two of  these measures prevented peasants from travelling in search of  food: (1) the introduction in 
December 1932 of  domestic identity documents (“passports”) only for city residents, limiting the peasants’ abil-
ity to travel to cities in search of  food; and (2) the closing of  borders between Ukraine (as well as the Northern 
Caucasus) and Russia in January 1933, stopping the flow of  Ukrainian peasants to Russia in search of  food. 
Thousands of  Ukrainian peasants were arrested in Russia and returned to their villages (CC ACP 2001). 
Second, Stalin’s directive dated 1 January 1933 reiterated the penalties outlined in the decree dated 7 August 
1932, for ‘stealing’ stalks from the fields or hiding grain from the State, and harsh penalties in kind (meat and 
potatoes) introduced on 18 and 20 November 1932 for independent farmers and kolkhozes that did not fulfill 
their grain quotas. 
Third, numerous brigades of  Communist Party activists descended towards the end of  1932 and beginning 
of  1933 on villages to confiscate hidden grain, although most of  it had been already seized, especially in Kyiv 
and Kharkiv oblasts. According to thousands of  testimonies, even if  no grain was found, in many instances 
every last scrap of  food was confiscated (see also Chubar’s letter to Stalin above). 
Fourth, a system of  blacklists was instituted in November 1932 against kolkhozes, entire villages, and in 
some cases raions that failed to fulfill their grain quotas, and was gradually expanded to the whole country. ‘For 
a village to be blacklisted meant that: (1) all stores would be closed and supplies removed from the village; (2) all 
trade was prohibited, including trade in food or grain; (3) all loans and advances were called in, including grain 
advances; (4) the local Party and collective farm organizations were purged, and usually subject to arrest; (5) 
food and livestock would be confiscated as a ‘penalty’; and (6) the territory would be sealed off  by OGPU (secret 
police) detachments’ (Andriewsky 2015). In other words, a death sentence was imposed on the population of  
the given kolkhoz, village, or raion.
Once Moscow realized the catastrophic nature of  the famine, a program of  food aid was implemented 
during the first half  of  1933. The program entailed loans that the oblasts were required to pay back from the 
next harvest with 10 per cent interest, and had other strong restrictions. Boriak (2012) documents in detail the 
characteristics of  this program: (1) the food was to be given mainly to members of  kolkhozes who were willing 
and able to work, and to independent farmers willing to join the kolkhozes and work; (2) instructions for the 
administration of  the program show clearly that its main objective was not to prevent starvation but to provide 
badly needed aid in order to save the next sowing season; (3) a good part of  the food provided came from in-
ternal reserves (in Ukraine), that had been requisitioned from Ukrainian farmers in 1932 and were now being 
given back to them as ‘assistance’, with selective distribution. 
A total of  176,000 tons of  food, mainly grain, was distributed to the eight regions of  Ukraine between 
February and July 1933 (169,800 tons allocated to specific regions, plus 6,200 unallocated tons for selective 
distribution):
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Dnipropetrovsk Odesa Kharkiv Kyiv Vinnytsia Donetsk Chernihiv Moldavia
tons food aid 56,200 49,400 29,900 19,900 9,600 3,300 1,200 300
kg per person 20.5 22.3 6.4 3.9 2.3 1.6 0.5 0.6
The data illustrate the importance of  using relative indicators when making comparisons. In absolute num-
bers, the bulk of  the food aid went to Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts, with sizeable contributions also to 
Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts. However, standardizing by the size of  the respective rural populations introduces 
significant changes in the distribution. For example, the ranking between Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts is 
reversed, and more importantly, the difference in food aid amounts between Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa and 
the forest-steppe oblasts becomes much more pronounced. Thus, the actual amount to Dnipropetrovsk oblast 
is three times that given to Kharkiv oblast, instead of  just under double as per the unadjusted figures.
To illustrate the devastating effect of  Stalin’s measures in late 1932 and early 1933 on the level and distribution 
of  monthly losses in these oblasts in 1933, we selected two oblasts from the forest-steppe region, Kyiv and Khark-
iv, and two from the steppe region, Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk. We show the relationship between the volume and 
timing of  this food aid, and the number and monthly pattern of  excess deaths in each of  these oblasts. 
The oblasts in the forest-steppe and those in the steppe region have very different patterns of  monthly excess 
deaths in 1933 (Figure 1). Kyiv and Kharkiv experienced a sharp increase in monthly excess deaths between January 
and June, and then a sharp decrease. The rate of  increase for Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk was somewhat smaller 
than for Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts, with the peak in June being much lower and the decrease during the second half  
of  1933 being much less pronounced. The ratio of  direct losses between the peak month of  June and January of  
1933 is even higher than the ratio of  registered deaths. During the first half  of  1933, the number of  excess deaths 
increased by 14–15 times in Kharkiv and Kyiv, and by 7–8 times in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts.
Figure 2 shows the timing and volume of  food distributed to the different oblasts, in tons per 1,000 rural 
population. The graph shows very clearly that Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts received much more food aid 
than Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts, and that this assistance started to arrive much earlier. 
Comparing the two figures, we see a strong relationship between the food aid dynamics and the patterns 
of  monthly excess deaths. The volume and timing of  food distributed are clearly reflected in the two distinct 
patterns of  monthly direct losses. The large amounts of  food sent to Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts in 
February and March had two effects: it slowed down the monthly increase of  direct losses and resulted in much 
lower peaks in June. The absence of  practically any food aid to Kyiv oblast before March, or to Kharkiv oblast 
before April, resulted in faster rates of  increase and much higher peaks in direct losses for these two oblasts. 
One can also detect specific effects of  the food assistance on the distribution of  excess deaths in certain 
oblasts. For example, the rate of  increase in monthly excess deaths slowed down between March and April in 
Kyiv oblast compared to Kharkiv oblast, and in Dnipropetrovsk oblast compared to Odesa oblast. This is likely 
related to the large amount of  food aid sent to Kyiv oblast in mid-March, and larger amounts of  food aid pro-
vided to Dnipropetrovsk oblast than to Odesa oblast in February and March. 
It is clear that the food aid program saved many lives in Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. However, the 
main goal of  the program was to save the 1933 harvest, and thus the assistance was targeted at specific oblasts 
and groups. As a result, many more peasants were condemned to death by starvation in Kyiv and Kharkiv ob-
lasts than in the strategically more important oblasts of  Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk. Although the number of  
excess deaths was significantly lower in the steppe than in the forest-steppe oblasts, the rate of  monthly increase 
and maximum levels of  death in Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk were still extremely high.
Historical legacy of  peasant uprisings
For the sake of  completeness, we shall also examine a hypothesis that suggests links between high regional 
direct losses and past events in those regions. It posits that the degree of  resistance and resulting persecutions in 
certain regions, described in the section ‘Resistance and repressions in 1932,’ is related to different types of  peas-
ant revolts having occurred in those places during the preceding period (1918–31). Thus, regions with strong 
resistance to collectivization and grain procurement in 1932 had a history of  rebellions in the past, of  which 
the Soviet regime was keenly aware—especially in relation to the great social and national uprising of  the spring 
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and summer of  1919, which had forced them out of  Ukraine, and in particular out of  its two capitals (Kyiv and 
Kharkiv).8 This historical memory resulted, first, in stronger repressions and thus higher excess deaths in 1932, 
and then in a decision, taken in late 1932 and applied during the following months, to use hunger as a tool to 
eradicate the possibility of  a new general uprising, and to deprive the Ukrainian national movement of  its social 
base, which Stalin had identified as being the villages (Graziosi 2015). 
If  this hypothesis is correct, the effects of  the food aid program on 1933 direct losses, as described in the 
section ‘1933: Famine as terror,’ need to be compared to the effects of  the punitive policy in the different re-
gions. Testing this hypothesis requires two elements: a map depicting the historical revolts at the raion level, and 
8. This may have been a factor in the decision, taken in 1929, not to discontinue the extant state indigenization program
(korenizatsiia, or, in the case of  the Ukrainian SSR, ukraїnizatsiia) during collectivization—precisely because of  the
awareness of  the need to prevent a repetition of  social and national elements combining to engender peasant revolts, as
had occurred in Ukraine in 1919.
Figure 1. Monthly direct losses (per 1,000 rural population) for four oblasts of the 
Ukrainian SSR, 1933.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 2. Food aid to four oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR (tons/1,000 rural population), 1933.
Source: Davies and Wheatcroft 2009, pp. 481–4.
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1933 estimates of  rural direct losses at the raion level. We have calculated the estimates and hope that a map will 
be found to allow us to test this hypothesis. 
We do have, however, some elements that permit testing the first part of  this hypothesis, i.e., that uprisings 
during the 1918–31 period are linked to areas where stronger repressions were applied in 1932. Viola (1996) and 
Graziosi (1996) documented widespread peasant rebellions in different Soviet republics, starting in 1918, but their 
data is at the republic and large-region levels. On the other hand, recently discovered documents in Ukraine’s ar-
chives provide more information about these movements in specific regions of  Ukraine (Krutsyk 2011). 
First, however, we have to deal with a technical problem. The data on the historical peasant rebellions are 
for nine gubernias, while our estimates of  direct losses are for seven oblasts. Due to problems with vital statis-
tics for this period, it is impossible to make estimates of  excess deaths for the nine gubernias. However, we can 
approximate the nine gubernias with the 17-oblast structure in 1939 (15 oblasts plus Cherkasy and Kherson, 
which were created in 1944 and 1954, respectively). We estimated direct losses for these 17 oblasts, and then 
calculated direct losses for the nine gubernias based on the losses for the 17 oblasts. Table 8 shows the equiva-
lence between the nine gubernias and 17 oblasts, and the 1933 rural relative direct losses for the nine gubernias, 
as well as the 1933 losses.
The following indicators are presented in absolute and relative numbers (per one million rural population): 
number of  peasant uprisings, number of  clandestine organizations, and number of  rebel groups; all indicators are 
for the period 1918–32, and the rural population is given as of  1 January 1927. We see that neither absolute num-
bers nor indicators standardized by the rural populations of  respective gubernias show a relationship between the 
intensity of  rebellion indicators and relative numbers of  direct losses in 1932. The highest 1932 rural relative losses 
are in Kyiv gubernia, while the highest absolute and relative values for the three indicators are found mostly in other 
gubernias. The same applies to 1933 losses, with Poltava gubernia having the highest losses.
There are several problems with this test: (1) the data are for different periods, and it is difficult to establish 
common standards with the gubernias and their raion structures, as the administrative structures changed repeat-
edly during this period; (2) as witnessed by differing numbers on the different types of  peasant resistance presented 
by Viola (1996) and Graziosi (1996) under different labels, there seems to be a lack of  established definitions for 
concepts describing these events; and (3) the reliability of  official statistics has not been evaluated. A key problem 
is that only macro-level data (for gubernias) is available, while a more valid test would require data at the raion level, 
especially of  the uprisings in 1919. The fact that currently available data does not support this hypothesis does not 
mean that the hypothesis is incorrect; further research is needed before a more definite judgment can be made. 
Table 8. Indicators of peasant resistance movements in Soviet Ukraine, by gubernia, 1917–32
Absolute numbers Per one million peasants* % of
1932 
rural 
direct 
losses
% of 
1933 
rural 
direct 
losses
9 gubernias 17 oblasts  (equivalent)
Number 
of peasant 
uprisings, 
1918–32
Number 
of clan-
destine 
organi- 
zations
Number 
of rebel 
groups
Number 
of peasant 
uprisings, 
1918–32
Number 
of clan-
destine 
organi 
zations
Number 
of rebel 
groups
Volyn +  
     Podillia
Zhytomyr + Vinnytsia 
+ Khmelnytskyi 
32 120 300 8 27 68 9 12
Kyiv Kyiv + Cherkasy 40 107 296 9 25 69 11.5 22
Poltava Poltava 29 103 165 9 32.5 52 6 24
Katerynoslav Dnipropetrovsk  
+ Zaporizhia + Kherson
21 57 104 8 21.5 39 5 10
Odesa Odesa + Mykolaiv 
+Kirovohrad
57 72 188 22 28 73 8 11
Chernihiv Chernihiv 32 64 137 16 33 70 6 8
Kharkiv Kharkiv + Sumy 34 65 133 14 26 54 6.5 12
Donetsk Donetsk + Luhansk 23 54 112 11.5 27 56 10 9
* As of 1 January 1927.
Sources: Krutsyk 2011 and authors’ calculations.
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Summary and conclusions
Our analysis has shown significant variation in Holodomor-caused direct losses at the oblast level in Soviet 
Ukraine. Several hypotheses about these differences have been evaluated, but no single hypothesis provides a 
comprehensive explanation. As pointed out by Plokhy (2016), the solution probably lies in a composite of  sev-
eral hypotheses. The direct loss levels in three oblasts—Chernihiv, Vinnytsia, and Donetsk—can be explained 
as specific cases. 
Firstly, Chernihiv oblast is part of  the Polissia region, and the only oblast that satisfies the ecological 
hypothesis. Besides the ecological advantage of  having food available in the forests and wetlands, Chernihiv 
did not fall under the close scrutiny of  the Soviet government, as it had the smallest land area dedicated to 
grain production. Thus, Chernihiv oblast was probably least affected by the searches for hidden grain in late 
1932 and early 1933, which likely explains its low level of  rural direct losses in 1933, and thus for the whole 
1932–34 period (Table 3). 
Next, the lower level of  direct losses in Vinnytsia oblast, compared to Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts, can be 
explained to some degree by the border hypothesis, as the lower levels of  direct losses in border raions bring 
down the oblast average. Thirdly, the low level of  direct losses in Donetsk oblast is due to several unique charac-
teristics. This oblast had the lowest percentage rural population, and moreover it received special assistance from 
Moscow due to the strategic importance of  its industrial infrastructure; workers in these enterprises belonged 
to a privileged group that received adequate food rations, and this probably allowed them to help their families 
in the countryside. If  we exclude Moldavia, three indicators support Donetsk oblast’s privileged position: (1) 
the overall reduction of  its grain quota was the largest among the steppe oblasts (Table 5); (2) it had the lowest 
number of  registered ‘terror’ acts; and (3) it had the lowest number of  in-kind fines, including among independ-
ent farmers (Table 7).9
Table 9. Comparison of oblasts with high (Kyiv and Kharkiv) and low 
(Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk) rural relative excess deaths during Holodomor
# Indicator High losses Low losses
1932–34 rural excess deaths/100 population 23 13
A – Background indicators
1 1932 grain quotas: % other crops 16% 4%
2 1932 grain quotas: % independent farmers 29% 7%
3 % overall reduction of 1932 grain quotas 53% 35%
4 % fullfilment 1932 grain quotas, 1/1933 81% 70%
B – Resistance and repressions indicators
5 % grains collected of 1933 sawing quota 18% 32.5%
6 # of petitions to leave kolkhozes, 1932:
- individuals 7,212 460
- farms 212 24
- raions 57 9
7 # of fines in kind, 1932* 350 299
8 % independent farmers among all fined, 1932 99** 93
9 % of registered ‘terror’ acts, 1932* 80 69
C – Situation in 1933
10 1933 excess deaths: June/January 14 8
11 1933 food assistance (kg per rural inhabitant) 5.1 21.3
* per 1,000,000 rural population
** for Kyiv only; there is an error in the original data for Kharkiv
Source: Authors’ calculations.
9. Moldavia does not seem to fit a pattern and we excluded it from our analysis. Given its small size and the fact that it was
part of  Ukraine only during a limited period (1924 to 1940), this exclusion has little effect on understanding the regional
dynamics of  Holodomor losses.
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We are left with having to explain the levels of  excess deaths differences between Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts 
and Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.10 The evidence summarized in Table 9 shows that the much higher lev-
els of  direct losses in Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts than in Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts can be explained by 
a combination of  the economic hypothesis, significantly higher levels of  resistance and repressions in the first 
two oblasts and selective implementation of  the food assistance program in 1933. 
A second result is the elaboration and quantification of  the already known fact that the dynamic of  the 
Holodomor was very different in 1932 than in 1933. The onset of  the famine is characterized by regional 
differences in collectivization, grain quota fulfillment, opposition to collectivization and grain procurement, 
and levels of  repressions against this opposition. The sudden explosion of  deaths, and thus direct losses, 
during the first half  of  1933 can only be explained as the result of  the actions implemented towards the end 
of  1932 and beginning of  1933, as listed above in the section ‘1933: Famine as Terror.’ Although no docu-
ment has been found with a general directive to confiscate not only all grain but also other foodstuffs during 
the searches for ‘hidden’ or ‘stolen’ grain, the demographic evidence does not leave room for any other ex-
planation. The regional differences in direct losses found in 1933 are to a great extent a function of  selective 
implementation of  the food aid program, and it remains to be seen whether a set of  politically-motivated 
actions rooted in the 1919 Soviet experience in Ukraine, and the active resistance in the 1920s and early 1930s, 
constituted additional factors.
Our analysis documents the complex dynamics of  the Holodomor and shows that there are still quite a few 
unanswered questions. Examples of  areas that require systematic research are: (1) the possible link between 
peasant uprisings during the 1918–31 period and the level of  excess losses in 1932, and the more specific link 
between the 1919 uprisings and direct losses in 1933; (2) more systematic research on the searches carried out 
for hidden food in late 1932 and early 1933; and (3) the role of  the nationality factor in chances of  survival.
Finally, we observe that research on the 1932–34 famine in Soviet Ukraine has been pursued independently 
along two disciplines: demography and history. Our approach of  addressing both demographic analysis and 
historical research illustrates the importance of  such a combined strategy. Often historical evidence is needed to 
explain demographic results, and demographic techniques can be used to test hypotheses suggested by historical 
analysis, or hypotheses derived from historical analysis can suggest specific demographic analyses. The comple-
mentarity of  the two disciplines provides a more fruitful strategy for researching the Holodomor. 
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